Korea's President Wants Hostile Takeovers to Break Conglomerate Grip
President Lee Jae-myung has publicly called for activating hostile M&A as the primary tool to fix South Korea's chronically undervalued stock market. The move signals a radical shift in how Seoul plans to tackle entrenched controlling shareholders.
When the president wants you to be hostile
At a capital markets symposium at the Korea Exchange on November 13, President Lee Jae-myung did something unexpected for a head of state in a country where business-politics ties are historically intimate. He told attendees to raise their hands on whether they supported expanding the mandatory tender offer threshold to 50 percent plus one share, or to 100 percent. Nearly everyone picked the lower number.
Then he made his position clear. Hostile mergers and acquisitions are not the enemy. They are the cure.
“It is sad and very unfair that identical stocks are undervalued simply because they are listed in Korea,” Lee said. “The single most important mechanism for normalizing the market is hostile M&A.”
He went further, ordering financial regulators to conduct a full inventory of every policy obstacle blocking hostile deals. “I wonder if there aren’t several brakes hiding along the way,” he said, suggesting that authorities have been quietly steering policy to protect incumbents rather than promote competition.
The PBR trap
The context is blunt. After the KOSPI hit a record high in June 2026, the index fell sharply, touching the 5,000 level and forcing the government to treat capital market reform as urgent. But the deeper problem is structural, not cyclical. Hundreds of listed companies trade below book value — a symptom of concentrated ownership that keeps outside investors priced out of influence.
According to data cited by investment firm Trustone Asset Management’s Lee Sung-won, there are 570 listed companies where the controlling shareholder and its related parties own more than 50 percent of shares while the stock trades at a price-to-book ratio below 1. Those firms have effectively privatized themselves through the back door: they enjoy the prestige and liquidity of being listed, yet no competitive pressure can reach the owner who runs them like a family enterprise.
Lee pressed the point directly. “They collect all the benefits of being listed while practically monopolizing management. Shouldn’t we stop that?”
The exchange’s own rules create part of the loophole. A company is flagged as a management supervision stock if regular shareholders hold less than 5 percent on the main board or less than 20 percent on KOSDAQ. Two consecutive years there and delisting follows. But Lee noted that even owners holding 70 or 80 percent can stay listed under certain interpretations, which means hostile bids cannot gain traction — the controlling family never faces a genuine vote.
The tender offer crossroads
The policy fight right now centers on the mandatory tender offer regime, which passed a standing committee with a compromise between the ruling party and the opposition but remains stuck in the full National Assembly. The question is simple and consequential: should a bidder who crosses the 50 percent plus one threshold be required to buy only enough to secure control, or should it have to make an offer for every remaining share?
Supporters of the full buyout rule, led by small-shareholder advocates and some asset managers, argue that minority holders deserve equal treatment when a change of control occurs. Professors such as Kim Woo-chan of Kyung Hee University pointed out that no evidence shows a 100 percent mandatory tender offer chokes off M&A activity in other jurisdictions.
Opponents, including the Private Equity Fund Managers Association’s Park Byeong-geon, warn that forcing complete buyouts raises the cost of deals so much that Korean companies become easier prey for well-capitalized foreign acquirers. In a market already strained by currency pressures and capital flight risks, the argument goes, domestic buyers need a realistic path to consolidation.
Lee sided with the lower threshold. “Even if I get cursed for it,” he said, “I lean toward expanding the pie — activating M&A so the entire market normalizes and all shareholders benefit.”
It is a pragmatic choice. The 50 percent plus one standard mirrors the approach used in several mature markets and leaves room for subsequent buyout negotiations without making initial bids prohibitively expensive. Whether it adequately protects minorities remains an open question, and one that will likely surface again in legislative debate.
What changes next
Perhaps the most significant detail from the November 13 meeting was Lee’s instruction to establish a new high-level public-private committee dedicated to capital market revitalization. That gives the proposal institutional weight beyond a presidential statement — it signals that regulators and industry players will be pushed to produce concrete measures, not just rhetoric.
Meanwhile, lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Party have introduced what has been called the “Korean-style bear hug” bill, which would force any listed company receiving a merger proposal to disclose the terms to all shareholders immediately. The intent is to prevent deliberate share-price suppression before a deal closes, a practice that has long disadvantaged small investors in Korea.
Taken together, the moves suggest Seoul is trying to recalibrate the market’s power balance. Controlling families that have treated listed vehicles as private fiefdoms will face a harder environment. Activist investors and private equity funds may find new openings. And companies with genuinely inefficient governance could become acquisition targets in a way they have rarely been before.
The risk is that the reforms stall in parliament or lose force in implementation. Korea has discussed capital market modernization before. What distinguishes this moment is the president’s willingness to use language — “normalization,” “brakes,” “unfair” — that frames hostile acquisition not as a predatory act but as a public good. How far that framing translates into enforceable law will determine whether the 570 undervalued companies simply keep waiting, or finally face competition for their future.