How One Couple Bypassed U.S. Chip Bans With State-Sanctioned Data
A Korean investigative report reveals how Alice Huang and her husband ran a coordinated two-front operation to smuggle restricted NVIDIA chips into China. The scheme exposed a critical gap in U.S. export-control enforcement.
A marriage of convenience became a smuggling pipeline
Alice Huang did not hold a title at NVIDIA. She held something far more valuable: access to Jensen Huang, the company’s CEO, through an extramarital affair. Through that relationship she obtained priority allocations of chips the U.S. government had explicitly barred from sale to China.
Her husband, Kang Wei, took the other half of the equation. Between 2021 and 2024 he constructed more than $9 billion worth of data-center facilities across China — all with government subsidies, some tied to national strategic projects, and partly in partnership with companies already on U.S. sanctions lists.
This was not two separate business ventures. It was a coordinated two-front operation designed to turn U.S. export restrictions into a competitive advantage for Chinese AI development.
How the supply chain was breached
Singapore was the hinge. Through a company called MegaSpeed, registered there, Alice Huang negotiated with NVIDIA to become a cloud partner, securing preferential access to GPU shipments. In November 2023, she announced Alibaba — China’s largest e-commerce platform and a major AI investor — as a key customer. That partnership gave the arrangement a veneer of legitimacy while redirecting chip allocations toward domestic Chinese use.
Part of those chips then flowed southward into China itself. The mechanism remains under investigation, but the pathway is now clear enough: NVIDIA supplies an authorized overseas intermediary, that intermediary diverts hardware destined for sanctioned entities, and the resulting compute capacity feeds directly into China’s artificial-intelligence ambitions.
In 2024 and early 2025, the couple went further still. They pitched outside investors — both in Shanghai and across Southeast Asia — with a promise of triple returns within three years for funding operations that would bring restricted NVIDIA chips into China. That is no longer speculative behavior. It is the financialization of sanctions evasion, and it puts ordinary investors at risk alongside the principals.
The infrastructure side: state-backed construction
Kang Wei’s side of the operation is documented in Chinese corporate filings and public records reviewed by the Wall Street Journal. His primary vehicle, Century Longteng, was incorporated in late 2021 in Shanghai. It is majority-owned by Century Huatong, a gaming giant listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, with Kang Wei’s Hurricane Capital Fund holding 27 percent and a Shanghai municipal government entity owning the remainder.
The scale is what stands out. In 2022, Century Longteng signed a computing collaboration agreement with Huawei — a firm under active U.S. sanctions — positioning it inside the very supply chains Washington sought to isolate. By summer of that year, it broke ground on a $4.5 billion data-center complex in Wuhu, Anhui province, covering land equivalent to 70 soccer fields and including 24,000 server racks. That facility completed its first building in April 2025.
Another $5 billion groundbreaking followed in Liangshan, Sichuan province, in July 2024, with additional development underway near the southern technology hub of Shenzhen.
Critically, the Wuhu project was integrated into China’s East Data West Computing initiative — a national strategy designed to relocate energy-intensive data processing from coastal cities to inland provinces. That means the centers received not just capital from local government entities but also the policy framing and incentives reserved for strategic infrastructure. The Chinese state was effectively subsidizing the physical plant that would eventually host the same chips the U.S. tried to keep out.
Who knew what, and when
Kang Wei introduced Alice Huang to Jensen Huang at a professional gathering originating from his earlier career in the video-game industry. Reports indicate he was aware of the relationship and did nothing to stop it. Whether he shared in the proceeds or merely tolerated the arrangement as part of the family strategy remains unclear — but the division of labor suggests premeditation rather than coincidence.
U.S. officials likely suspected something was moving through Singapore well before the scandal became public. Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs investigated MegaSpeed in February 2025 after finding false declarations about server purchases, issued Alice Huang a formal warning, and banned her from re-entry. Six people associated with the company remain under investigation. MegaSpeed’s current statement — that it operates legally and that Alice Huang holds no position — does not explain why the ban stands.
Kang Wei was detained in Shanghai earlier this year on suspicion of stock-market manipulation and has since been released. Photos published recently show him at Stanford University, mingling with acquaintances, suggesting he retains international mobility despite the ongoing legal exposure.
Why this matters beyond a celebrity scandal
The affair and espionage narrative that dominated headlines obscures the structural lesson. China’s AI strategy does not rely on breaking every rule simultaneously. It runs on a distributed model: one actor obtains authorization through legitimate channels, another exploits proximity to decision-makers at supplier companies, a third secures physical infrastructure through state-linked enterprise, and a fourth raises capital from dispersed investors who may never see the provenance of the technology enabling their returns.
Each piece, individually, looks defensible. Together, they form an architecture that defeats the intent of export controls without technically violating any single law that regulators have been able to prosecute so far.
That is the real vulnerability exposed here. NVIDIA’s channel-partner system, designed to extend its commercial reach, became the delivery mechanism. Singapore’s regulatory framework, attractive for its neutrality, became the transit point. China’s local governments, eager to attract data-center investment, became the landlords. And the couples running the operation learned to place themselves at every junction.
What happens next
NVIDIA faces immediate reputational damage and likely deeper compliance scrutiny. The company will need to reassess how it grants partner status, monitors end-use certifications, and auditors its own distribution channels — especially the intermediaries operating in third countries with looser disclosure requirements.
U.S. regulators may broaden the scope of enforcement to cover indirect diversion routes that do not pass through direct Chinese territory. The Singapore bans could prompt similar travel restrictions against other individuals connected to Chinese semiconductor procurement networks.
But the deeper question is whether export controls can survive a system where violations are orchestrated through personal relationships rather than corporate conspiracies. The Huang case demonstrates that the bottleneck is not logistics. It is trust.
Jensen Huang trusted someone close to him. Channel partners trusted certificates of end-use. Investors trusted projected returns. None of them appear to have verified what was actually happening downstream.
The chips kept flowing. The data centers kept filling up. And the enforcement apparatus spent the entire time chasing rumors instead of evidence.