business 5 min read

How Nvidia Chips Secretly Flow Into China Through Singapore

A Singapore-based company bought billions in Nvidia chips while its former director — tied to CEO Jensen Huang’s personal scandal — reportedly funneled them to China. The loophole exposes a flaw in US export controls.

  • Semiconductors
  • US-China Tech War
  • Export Controls
  • Singapore Tech

The chip loophole no one could seal

Megaspeed International sits in a glass tower overlooking Singapore’s Marina Bay — the kind of headquarters a city-state proudly shows off at investor roadshows. Three years ago it was the dormant Chinese gaming subsidiary 7Road International. By late 2023, it had become one of Asia’s largest purchasers of American advanced semiconductors.

At least $4 billion worth, according to transaction records reviewed by CNN Japan.

That figure alone is striking. But the real revelation is how those chips ended up going somewhere they were never meant to land.

Megaspeed’s rise has placed it at the center of two intersecting scandals: Jensen Huang’s resignation over an extramarital affair, and a wider pattern of US export-control evasion that officials fear is far more systematic than anyone initially believed.

The person at the center

Alice Huang, 43, a Chinese national known also as Huang Lu, played a key role in founding Megaspeed. She served on its board until November 2023. US officials consider her a Chinese intelligence operative. Beijing calls the allegation baseless slander.

Huang is also the woman at the heart of the scandal that forced Nvidia’s CEO off his desk. Jensen Huang admitted to the affair and resigned December 12. Congress has demanded he testify privately about their relationship.

The personal and the geopolitical are now inseparable in this case. A woman FBI and other agencies view as linked to Chinese intelligence helped build a company that appears to have been a conduit for bypassing exactly the restrictions she would have been ordered to circumvent.

CNN has repeatedly attempted to reach Alice Huang for comment without success.

What Megaspeed actually did

Here is the basic pattern, pieced together from corporate filings, trade data, and official sources:

Megaspeed purchased Nvidia chips and related equipment. It declared the chips were destined for data centers across Southeast Asia. In reality, a significant portion apparently reached Chinese end users — including entities already on the Commerce Department’s Entity List.

Singapore’s authorities opened their own investigation. They allege Megaspeed and associates provided false declarations about server purchases and final destinations. The Internal Affairs Ministry said there was insufficient evidence to link Huang to violations, but barred her from re-entering the country for providing inaccurate information about her role at Megaspeed. Other probes continue.

Tan Yong Peng, Megaspeed’s CEO, released a statement December 12 saying the company is cooperating with the US Commerce Department’s investigation and has hired a US law firm to independently verify its compliance with export regulations.

That sounds responsible. Whether it amounts to damage control or genuine reform remains unclear.

The shadow industry beneath the rules

The United States began restricting advanced semiconductor sales to China in 2022. The intention was clear: slow China’s military-civil fusion and AI development by cutting off the most capable chips.

What followed was almost predictable.

Complex transactions multiplied. Paper companies appeared. Smugglers started hiding chips inside other electronics and shipping containers. William George, who tracks trade data for CNN, described the route: chips enter through Singapore, Malaysia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, then move into China — sometimes routing through Thailand. The system exploits what he called “extremely lax monitoring of US air cargo data.”

Epoch AI estimated last year that between 290,000 and 1.6 million cutting-edge American semiconductors entered China in violation of export controls.

Carper Research, a short-selling firm, found that roughly 20 percent of Nvidia’s chip sales still ultimately serve Chinese end users despite tightened rules.

Alex Capri, a senior lecturer at the National University of Singapore Business School, put it plainly: demand for Nvidia chips in China is bottomless because no alternative matches their performance. As long as that gap exists, someone will find a way around the restrictions.

Even sanctioned entities are buying

Perhaps the most damning detail comes from an unlikely source. Northwest Polytechnical University in Xi’an — one of China’s Defense Seven universities with deep military ties, on the Entity List since 2001 — purchased four H200 chips, Nvidia’s pared-down China version, for $250,000. The procurement record was published on the university’s website last month before being taken down.

The H200 itself was a compromise. President Trump lobbied Huang to ease restrictions during two meetings with President Xi earlier this year. The Commerce Department approved limited sales to certain buyers, retaining a quarter of the revenue for the US government. Sanctioned entities like Northwest Polytechnical were not supposed to qualify.

They bought anyway.

Who wins, who loses

The immediate winner is whoever moved the chips. Megaspeed is not currently classified as a national security threat by the US government and faces no purchase restrictions — a decision by Commerce Secretary Ratcliffe that reportedly sparked a disagreement with Treasury Secretary Bessent, according to two people familiar with the matter.

Losers are harder to name but easier to identify. US export-control credibility takes another hit. Every chip that reaches a sanctioned Chinese lab without detection makes the next restriction regime look thinner.

Chinese defense and AI programs keep advancing on hardware they were supposed to be denied.

What happens next

Trump is scheduled to meet Xi in Shenzhen later this week — their third encounter of the year. Trade officials in both capitals will be thinking about leverage. China knows the restrictions don’t fully work. The US knows it. Neither side wants to admit it publicly.

Democratic lawmakers in both chambers are pushing for tighter monitoring of semiconductor exports to China. Capri argues the world needs new transparency standards and enforceable traceability requirements, not just more sanctions on paper.

“This is the beginning of a large-scale crackdown,” he said. “It means export-control enforcement is moving to the next stage.”

Whether it moves fast enough is the real question. The network behind Megaspeed didn’t appear overnight. It grew slowly, quietly, through gaps that existed precisely because someone decided a partial ban was better than none at all.

Closing those gaps requires more than statements and investigations. It requires tracking every chip past the first buyer — which is a lot harder than it sounds when the money flows through Singapore and the paperwork looks legitimate on arrival.