Russian Capital Is Secretly Funding Alaska LNG

A Russian Company Bought Its Way Into America’s Arctic Gas Field

Novatek, one of Russia’s largest energy firms and a named target of US sanctions, funneled money into the Polar LNG project in Alaska — a venture that aims to bring Arctic gas to market from US soil. It was supposed to come from a UAE-backed investor. Instead, the capital trace led back to Moscow.

That is the central revelation from a New York Times report, and it is more than a financial anomaly. It shows how Russian energy money can slip through US sanction frameworks when the target is a project marketed as American energy development.

The former CEO of Polar LNG, Joel Riddle, resigned last month and told the Times he had been given misleading information about the funding source. “Controlling the commercialization of North Slope natural gas in Alaska with Russian technology would be not only illegal but contrary to US interests,” he said, urging the Trump administration to investigate.

Polar LNG dismissed his claims and has launched its own internal review. But a legal memo from the company’s law firm, obtained by the Times, shows the US Treasury itself raised “potential concerns” about the relationship between Polar LNG and Novatek under current sanctions.

Novatek confirmed it is pursuing a “minority shareholder” position in the project.

Why It Matters for US Energy Security

Alaska sits on enormous natural gas reserves, but they have never been commercially developed at scale. The North Slope gas field, discovered decades ago, remains locked behind economics and logistics — not geology. Getting that gas to market requires enormous capital, specialized ice-class vessels, and engineering that few companies can deliver.

Novatek has exactly that kind of engineering capacity. It operates the Nord Stream pipelines and runs Russia’s only operational Arctic LNG project, Nord Stream 2. It also has connections to Hanwha Ocean in South Korea, which built the specific ice-breaking LNG carriers that were originally contracted for the Nord Stream 2 project before US sanctions forced their cancellation.

Now those same ships — or the structural capacity they represent — may end up supporting an American LNG project funded in part by the very company the sanctions were designed to isolate.

This is not merely ironic. It is a structural problem. The US has built its energy strategy around the idea that domestic production, especially in Alaska, reduces dependence on hostile suppliers. But reducing dependence on Russian gas does not mean eliminating Russian expertise, equipment, or capital from the value chain. And in the race to develop Alaskan gas, Novatek may have quietly inserted itself into the pipeline.

The Geopolitical Layer: Trump, Putin, and Energy Bargaining

The timing of this revelation is striking. According to people familiar with the discussions, the Trump administration and Russian President Vladimir Putin have been discussing Alaskan LNG cooperation as part of broader Ukraine ceasefire negotiations. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, serving as Trump envoys, met with Putin last month and the Alaskan LNG project came up.

The logic from the White House appears to be that energy cooperation with Russia could ease tensions enough to advance a Ukraine deal. That logic is disputed. Jeffrey Fawcett, a former State Department assistant secretary for energy resources, called the idea of allowing Novatek into Alaska’s LNG sector “an environmentally, economically and geopolitically terrible idea.”

A person connected to the Trump family is also involved. Gentle Bich, a childhood friend of Donald Trump Jr., disclosed in a February interview that he had been negotiating with Novatek about bringing its natural gas technology to Alaska. He held a senior finance role at the 2017 inauguration. Trump Jr.’s office has since said the two are no longer close and that he is not involved with Polar LNG.

The involvement of Trump associates raises the stakes beyond a routine corporate deal. It signals that this project has political air cover inside the administration — exactly the kind of cover that sanctions-evasion schemes require.

Two Projects, One Resource, Competing Fates

Polar LNG is not the only proposal moving for Alaskan gas. Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are evaluating participation in a separate pipeline-based project that would transport North Slope gas through roughly 1,300 kilometers of pipeline to the southern coast, where it would be liquefied and shipped to Asia. That project is simpler to sanitize politically — it has visible Asian investment and no direct Russian involvement.

But the Polar LNG approach is technically different and arguably faster to deploy. Instead of building a massive onshore pipeline, it proposes installing liquefaction infrastructure directly at the resource site and using ice-class carriers to ship product through frozen waters. That is essentially the model Novatek already runs at Sabetta in the Russian Arctic.

The two projects are effectively competitors for the same gas and the same limited window of commercial viability. If Polar LNG moves first with Russian capital and technology, the pipeline project loses its rationale. If the pipeline wins political support, Polar LNG stalls.

The outcome will depend on Washington regulators — specifically, whether the Treasury grants Novatek a license to invest in an American energy project. That is the hinge.

What Happens Next

Several scenarios are possible, and none are clean.

If the Treasury approves a Novatek minority stake, it sets a precedent that US sanctions can be bypassed through indirect investment in American resource projects. That weakens the entire sanctions architecture, not just the energy piece. It also means Moscow gains equity in a strategic US asset while retaining its Arctic LNG expertise — the very expertise the US wants to keep away from adversarial hands.

If the Treasury blocks the deal, Polar LNG may struggle to find alternative funding. The project’s economics depend on Novatek’s technology and ice-class vessel capability. Without it, the cost of developing Alaskan gas rises significantly, potentially killing the project outright or delaying it by years.

If the project goes forward through a third-party vehicle — the UAE mechanism that initially masked Novatek’s involvement — the sanctions evasion becomes institutionalized. That is the most damaging outcome: not a single deal, but a model for how Russian capital enters American resource projects without triggering the legal restrictions that normally apply.

Riddle’s resignation and disclosure suggest someone inside the project chose to blow the whistle. Whether that leads to action depends on political will. The Trump administration has shown it is willing to explore energy cooperation with Russia as a path to Ukraine peace. That openness makes regulatory enforcement less likely, not more.

For now, the gas in the Alaskan permafrost remains undrilled. The money to develop it may be closer to home than policymakers want to admit.