Ethiopia's Tigray War Resurges: The Alliance That Could Split the Country

Streets of Mekelle Fill With Panic Again

Tigrayan fighters are back on patrol in Mekelle. Residents who thought they had escaped the horrors of the 2020–2022 war are now buying food in hurried trips, fearing a return to full‑scale conflict. Internet and mobile networks have been disrupted, leaving a largely cashless society unable to access bank accounts because ATMs stopped working months ago. The scene is a stark reminder of how thin the veneer of peace has become.

Fighting erupted last week between Tigray’s regional forces and the national army, quickly spreading into the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions. Both sides blame the other for starting the escalation. The TPLF says it responded to federal drone strikes; the government claims Tigrayan troops seized airports first. Either way, the Pretoria Agreement—a peace deal brokered by the African Union in November 2022 that ended the devastating two‑year war—is unravelling.

Why Now? Four Unresolved Fault Lines

The collapse did not happen overnight. For more than six months, relations between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) have deteriorated. Four core issues remain unresolved:

Western Tigray: During the war, Amhara regional forces seized fertile territories in western Tigray. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tigrayans were displaced and now live in camps. The TPLF wants the land back and the displaced to return. Addis Ababa insists the territory’s future must be decided by referendum. This dispute is not merely territorial—it is about identity, memory, and who controls the land that sustained Tigray’s economy for decades.

Disarmament: The government accuses the TPLF of handing over only obsolete weapons to AU monitors while hiding modern arms. Trust is so low that verification is nearly impossible without third‑party guarantees that neither side believes will be impartial.

Governance: Under Pretoria, an interim administration was appointed by Abiy. Tensions over his influence boiled over before May’s general election, which was not held in Tigray. The TPLF then restored its pre‑war administration, disbanding Abiy’s appointees. Civil servants are no longer paid, services are seizing up, and the economic foundation of the region is crumbling.

Legitimacy: For much of modern Ethiopian history, the TPLF—once a Marxist insurgent group that helped overthrow the military regime in 1991—dominated the ruling coalition. When Abiy dissolved that coalition and formed the Prosperity Party in 2018, he effectively marginalized the TPLF, despite Tigrayans making up only about 6% of Ethiopia’s population. The current clash is, in part, a struggle over who gets to define Ethiopia’s political future.

The Alliance for Survival: A Game Changer

Perhaps the most consequential development is the formation of the Alliance for Survival in early September. The TPLF joined six other armed movements—including Amhara’s Fano militia and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)—to create a coalition whose shared goal is to remove Abiy’s government from power.

This alliance is remarkable because its members have deep, often bitter differences. Fano and the TPLF fought on opposite sides during the civil war; they still disagree over western Tigray. The OLA has been battling the federal government in Oromia for years. Yet all share a single objective: ousting Abiy. TPLF officials say they do not want to repeat the isolation that left them vulnerable in 2020. Analysts caution that the alliance may be difficult to sustain once the immediate threat to Abiy recedes, because the underlying interests of its members remain divergent.

For Addis Ababa, the alliance is proof of a coordinated attempt to destabilize the country. The government has also accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups inside Ethiopia—a claim Asmara denies. The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been volatile since Eritrea’s secession in 1993, and it worsened during the recent war when Eritrean troops fought alongside Ethiopian forces. Today, the two neighbours are again at odds, partly over Ethiopia’s push for access to Eritrean ports, including the strategic Red Sea port of Assab, located just 60 km from the border. Abiy has hinted at the possibility of taking Assab by force, raising the specter of a broader regional war.

Humanitarian Consequences and Cashless Vulnerability

The humanitarian impact is already severe. The disruption of digital payment systems in a cashless society has left people unable to access their life savings. Panic buying has driven up prices and strained supplies. The AU estimates that around 600,000 people died during the previous war, many from starvation after Tigray was cut off from the outside world. A return to conflict could trigger a fresh famine, especially if aid routes are blocked again.

Reports indicate that federal forces have been using drones against Tigrayan positions. The government says it is responding to attacks and defending federal territory, but independent verification is difficult. In one town, drones struck two schools that local officials said had been used as military bases by Ethiopian troops during the war. Whether those facilities are still being used is unclear. Meanwhile, the TPLF has been forcibly recruiting young men, further straining the region’s capacity to absorb another wave of violence.

Diplomatic Efforts Hit a Wall

The African Union, the UN, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have all called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to talks. The AU has asked former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, its special envoy for the Horn of Africa, to engage the parties urgently. But diplomacy is stalling because trust between Addis Ababa and Tigray is near zero. The formation of the rebel alliance has complicated the picture, making it harder to identify a single interlocutor and raising fears that any settlement could empower a coalition that wants to dismantle the current state structure.

Who Wins, Who Loses, and What Happens Next

If the fighting escalates, the losers will be ordinary Ethiopians—especially in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar—already exhausted by years of war and displacement. The government risks losing control of large swathes of territory as the alliance expands. The TPLF may regain leverage but at the cost of further destroying the region it once governed. Neighbouring countries could be drawn in: Eritrea might intervene against the federal government, while Sudan’s warring factions find themselves on opposite sides of the Tigray conflict, adding another layer of regional instability.

The non‑obvious implication is that the Alliance for Survival represents a structural shift in Ethiopian politics. It is not merely a tactical cooperation; it signals that multiple armed movements believe the constitutional order established after the 2020 war can no longer accommodate their aspirations. Unless the root causes—territorial disputes, disarmament verification, governance legitimacy, and resource distribution—are addressed through inclusive dialogue, the risk of a fragmented Ethiopia will grow.

Western capitals, including the US and UK, have been slow to react, focusing more on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. That delay matters. Without urgent diplomatic engagement and humanitarian access, the crisis could spiral into a multi‑front civil war with consequences that extend far beyond the Horn of Africa.

The next few weeks will be decisive. If the AU’s call for a ceasefire holds and talks resume, there may yet be a path back to Pretoria. If not, Ethiopia could face its most dangerous conflict since 2020—and the world may watch too late.