Trump's Quiet Welcome for Germany's Far-Right Government

The Earthquake in Saxony-Anhalt

German state elections rarely register outside the country. But the result in Saxony-Anhalt on Sunday was something else entirely. The Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD, won 43.8 percent of the vote — a plurality that positions them just short of a majority in the state parliament. For the first time since the collapse of the Nazi regime, a far-right party is on the verge of governing in Germany.

The AfD is not a normal political actor. German intelligence services have placed the party under surveillance, monitoring it as a suspected extremist organization. Its leadership is now in coalition negotiations, though it remains unclear whether they can hold together enough allies to form a government. What is clear is the shock rippling through German politics. Chancellor Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic Union said the result had shaken his party “to its very foundations.”

With elections coming up later this month in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the fear is escalating that the AfD could convert these state-level breakthroughs into a national wave.

Cas Mudde, who has studied European far-right movements for decades, told Vox that the national conversation has shifted into crisis mode. “The national debate is now one of crisis, focusing attention on the success of the AfD and the alleged reasons for it,” Mudde said.

But perhaps the most striking detail about this election is not what happened in Saxony-Anhalt — it is who seems to welcome it.

The Trump Calculus

According to the reporting, the outcome aligns precisely with what the Trump administration has long wanted. This is the non-obvious implication that English-language coverage has largely overlooked: Washington’s tacit approval of a far-right German government represents a fundamental recalibration of US posture toward Europe — one that trades liberal democratic solidarity for transactional leverage.

The math behind the calculation is straightforward, if alarming. A Germany governed by or dependent on the AfD would be less likely to push for strategic autonomy within the EU. It would be more sympathetic to Trump’s America-first orientation. And it would be materially weaker in resisting Chinese economic influence — precisely because the AfD’s domestic agenda prioritizes cultural conservatism over geopolitical diversification.

This is not a conspiracy theory. It is realpolitik played out across the Atlantic, with the German electorate as the pawn.

What NATO Looks Like With an AfD in Power

The implications for NATO are immediate and concrete. Germany is the alliance’s financial backbone and its largest troop contributor in Europe. A far-right German government would almost certainly demand concessions from Washington before honoring those commitments — or, more likely, give Trump exactly the opening he has been seeking to question the entire enterprise.

Consider the defense spending debate. Trump has repeatedly demanded European NATO members raise their contributions to 5 percent of GDP. A Merz-led CDU government was already under pressure to comply. An AfD-influenced or AfD-led coalition would face even fiercer domestic opposition to increased military spending, precisely because the party’s base is skeptical of international institutional commitments.

Meanwhile, the EU’s defense strategy — which has been slowly cohering around the idea of a more independent European military capability — would lose its most important champion. Germany has been the quiet engine behind European strategic autonomy. Remove that engine, and the project stalls or collapses.

The China Question

Here is where the Trump administration’s calculus becomes clearest — and most dangerous. China is the stated strategic competitor of the United States. But Trump has never treated China policy as a coherent doctrine. He has treated it as a negotiating problem, and he has repeatedly signaled that he would prefer transactional deals over ideological alignment.

An AfD government in Berlin would be more susceptible to Chinese economic overtures. Germany’s auto industry, already struggling with the transition to electric vehicles, has deep dependencies on the Chinese market. An AfD-led government would be less likely to support restrictive measures on Chinese technology or investment — and more likely to resist US pressure to decouple from China.

This is not speculation. It is the logical extension of the AfD’s platform combined with Trump’s evident preference for dealing with authoritarian leaders regardless of their domestic records.

What Happens Next

The immediate future is uncertain. Coalition negotiations in Saxony-Anhalt could fail. The AfD might be isolated by other parties refusing to govern with them — a strategy known as the cordon sanitaire that has held in Germany for decades. But the fact that this strategy is being tested at all signals how much the political center has shifted.

The elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will be the next test. If the AfD wins there as well, the cordon may crack entirely. If they lose, Merz and the CDU will still have to contend with a party that has proven it can mobilize nearly half the electorate in eastern Germany.

For Washington, the choice is stark. The Trump administration can either double down on its implicit support for far-right movements across Europe — treating democratic norms as negotiable in exchange for short-term transactional gains — or it can reaffirm that the postwar order, however imperfect, was built on something more durable than brute leverage.

The stakes extend far beyond Saxony-Anhalt’s two million residents. They extend to the future of the transatlantic alliance itself.