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Saudi Ground Offensive Against Houthis Risks Escalating a Global

Riyadh is preparing a massive ground push to retake the Bab el-Mandeb strait from Houthi forces. The move could reshape Red Sea shipping — and deepen Yemen's humanitarian catastrophe.

  • Middle East
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Red Sea
  • Bab el-Mandeb
  • Yemen
  • Houthis

The Scale of What Riyadh Is Planning

Saudi Arabia is preparing one of the largest ground operations it has launched in Yemen since 2015. According to Reuters, which cited six regional and Western sources, up to 100,000 Yemeni government forces and pro-government militia members could be mobilized under Saudi command for a combined air-and-ground offensive aimed at wresting control of the Bab el-Mandeb strait from Houthi rebels.

The timing is still fluid — sources cited by Reuters gave windows ranging from within a week to sometime after the US midterm elections in November. But the direction is unmistakable: Riyadh is moving from years of constrained proxy warfare and aerial strikes toward a full-scale ground campaign.

This is not the 2015 operation. Michael Ratney, the former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, told Reuters the upcoming offensive will be more limited in scope, focused primarily on the coastal Bab el-Mandeb area rather than a wholesale attempt to topple the Houthi movement. The goal, in his words, is to restore pre-Houthi control of the strait and normalize maritime traffic — not to occupy Yemen.

Why the Strait Matters More Than Ever

The Bab el-Mandeb strait sits at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, connecting it to the Gulf of Aden and, ultimately, the Indian Ocean. It is one of the world’s most critical chokepoints for global energy and container shipping. In normal times, roughly 10 percent of global trade passes through it.

But this is not a normal moment. The ongoing Iran conflict has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, forcing commercial and military vessels to reroute through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb at far higher volumes. Any disruption here now has amplified consequences compared to even a year ago.

The Houthis seized control of the coastal approach to the strait last month through a rapid ground advance. That gave them leverage they have used to disrupt shipping, target vessels, and extract concessions from regional and international actors. Retaking that coastline is now Riyadh’s explicit objective — and the reason this offensive has global resonance beyond the Yemeni battlefield.

Two Scenarios, One Strategic Dilemma

According to Reuters, Saudi planners are weighing two distinct approaches. The first concentrates force around Bab el-Mandeb in a limited coastal strike. The second launches multi-front attacks simultaneously across Al Bayda, Marib, Taiz, and Al Jawf provinces — a broader campaign that risks spreading Saudi and Yemeni government forces thin.

The first option carries fewer immediate risks but may leave the Houthi movement intact in the interior. The second could achieve deeper territorial gains but invites the kind of protracted guerrilla war that plagued Saudi operations in previous years and drew fierce domestic and international criticism.

Either path carries humanitarian risk. Yemen was already facing what the UN has called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis before this escalation. A major ground offensive — regardless of its scale — will displace civilians, disrupt aid delivery, and likely trigger fresh Houthi retaliation against Saudi infrastructure.

The Defense Problem Riyadh Cannot Ignore

One of the less discussed constraints on Saudi decision-making is the kingdom’s vulnerability to Houthi cross-border strikes. Gulf sources told Reuters that protecting Saudi oil facilities and critical infrastructure from Houthi drones and missiles is a central concern shaping the operation’s timeline and scope.

Riyadh has been soliciting defense support from allies. The United States is already providing intelligence for the aerial component. Turkey and Pakistan, both of which signed joint defense agreements with Saudi Arabia last month, have supplied military equipment. But no coalition of arms suppliers eliminates the fundamental problem: the Houthis have demonstrated an ability to strike deep into Saudi territory, including hitting a school in Najran and damaging buildings with interceptor debris.

This defensive dimension likely explains why Saudi planners are leaning toward a limited coastal operation rather than an all-out推 invansion. A prolonged ground war would stretch Saudi forces across multiple fronts while leaving the kingdom exposed to ongoing Houthi missile and drone attacks.

The Regional and Global Ripple Effects

A Saudi-led ground offensive will reverberate well beyond Yemen’s borders. For shipping companies and insurance markets, even the threat of renewed fighting around Bab el-Mandeb is enough to spike freight rates and rerouting costs — costs that feed directly into global inflation.

For Iran, the Houthis are a key proxy node. Tehran will watch closely how far Riyadh is willing to go and whether the offensive opens a window for Iranian-backed militants to escalate elsewhere in the region. The Iran conflict that has already closed Hormuz could intensify on multiple fronts.

For the United States, the calculus is equally complicated. Washington has provided intelligence support but has shown no appetite for another large-scale Middle East ground war. A Saudi offensive that drags on risks drawing the US back in through necessity rather than choice — exactly the scenario American policymakers have spent years trying to avoid.

For Yemen’s civilians, the outlook is grim regardless of which scenario plays out. The country’s healthcare system is near collapse, millions face acute food insecurity, and any major military operation will deepen the displacement crisis. The 2022 UN-brokered truce that dampened fighting for nearly two years is effectively over, replaced by a new cycle of violence.

What Comes Next

The coming weeks will determine whether this becomes a controlled coastal operation or spirals into a wider war. Riyadh’s decision on scale and scope will shape the outcome. So will Houthi resilience — the group has survived years of bombing and sanctions, and it is unlikely to buckle under a single offensive.

What is clear is that the Bab el-Mandeb strait has become a focal point where Yemen’s internal conflict collides with global trade, great-power rivalry, and regional security. Who controls those coastal waters controls a gatekeeper of international commerce. Riyadh wants that gate back. The question is whether it can take it without setting off a chain reaction that nobody wants to manage.