The U.S. Says Hormuz Is Becoming Irrelevant. Energy Experts Disagree.

The Declaration

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told an NBC affiliate earlier this month that the Strait of Hormuz is on its way out. Over the next two years, he predicted, 50 to 70 percent of the energy products that normally transit this narrow chokepoint would reroute through underground pipelines. Hormuz, in his telling, would become just another body of water.

It was a confident line from Washington. And it was almost certainly wrong.

Energy analysts and the International Energy Agency, whose membership includes the United States, say the math simply doesn’t support that forecast. The gap between the administration’s assertion and the experts’ assessment is not just a technical disagreement — it’s a window into how the U.S. is managing expectations for a conflict it cannot easily win or leave.

The Numbers Don’t Add Up

Before the Iran war began in February 2026, roughly 20 million barrels per day moved through the Strait of Hormuz. That is the benchmark. Everything else is measured against it.

The UAE says a $3 billion pipeline expansion to its port of Fujairah — on the Gulf of Oman, not the Strait itself — could come online next year. That helps. But the IEA says other major projects, including a larger Saudi pipeline expansion, are years away. When those pipelines are eventually complete, the agency estimates, the volume that will still need to pass through Hormuz to restore prewar export levels could exceed 10 million barrels per day. Half of what moved before the war. Half of what the world expected to keep moving.

David Goldwyn, a former State Department special envoy on energy, put it bluntly: the new pipelines expected to come online over the coming years would amount to about 10 to 12 million barrels per day combined. Significantly below the 20 million that transited Hormuz before the conflict. “It’s a partial solution,” he said.

Why Pipelines Aren’t a Panacea

There are structural reasons why bypass infrastructure can’t replace shipping through Hormuz as quickly or as completely as Washington suggests.

First, most oil and LNG infrastructure in the Gulf was designed around the Strait. Repurposing it for pipelines takes time, capital, and geopolitical coordination — none of which are abundant right now. Iraq is negotiating with Turkey over a 600-mile pipeline from its northern fields to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The project has been stalled for years by disputes between Baghdad and Ankara, and by friction between the central government and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Iraq is also discussing a pipeline to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba and a revival of a defunct line to Syria. All of them face the same problem: they are political projects first, engineering projects second.

Second, pipelines themselves are vulnerable. Robert McNally, who served as senior director for international energy on the National Security Council under George W. Bush, pointed out that Iran has repeatedly demonstrated it can attack redirected routes and expanded terminal locations. Bypass infrastructure does not confer invulnerability. It confuses the picture only slightly.

Third, LNG cannot go through pipelines at all. Qatar, the world’s second-largest exporter, shares drilling rights on the massive South Pars field with Iran. Qatar criticized the U.S. sanctions as unilateral. Other Gulf producers have indicated they would comply. But Goldwyn noted the consequence: Qatar will either have to pay Iran a price for passage or suffer economically. Either way, consumers face higher natural gas prices.

The Chokepoint That Isn’t Really Alternative

The Bab el-Mandeb strait, between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, is sometimes presented as a backup route. It traditionally accounts for about 5 percent of global energy exports. Saudi Arabia has been fighting Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. After a Saudi strike on a Houthi-controlled runway at Sanaa’s airport, the Houthis responded by attacking Saudi-linked ships transiting Bab el-Mandeb.

McNally called it “a chokepoint, it’s a painful one, but it’s one we’ve been dealing with for the last few years. It comes and goes but it doesn’t trap supply. Whereas Hormuz traps supply as you see from shutdowns of field production and refinery outages in the region.”

The distinction matters. Hormuz is not just a narrow passage. It is the exit door for the majority of the Gulf’s exported energy. When it closes, entire fields shut in. Refineries idle. The pressure is systemic, not incidental.

Who Benefits From the Confidence

Bessent’s declaration came alongside new U.S. economic sanctions aimed at loosening Iran’s hold on the strait. The strategy appears to be: declare the crisis managed, and let markets adjust accordingly. But the sanctions have also disrupted a delicate commercial arrangement. Qatar’s reliance on the shared South Pars field means it cannot simply ignore Tehran. Compliance with U.S. sanctions may secure Washington’s favor but costs Doha in revenue and leverage.

Meanwhile, the breakdown of U.S.-Iran talks removes the only plausible path to a durable settlement on navigation rights. The IEA’s Schulz warned that bypass routes cannot substitute for a long-term regional agreement. “All the more so as the bypass routes remain vulnerable to attack,” she said, pointing to the ongoing Red Sea disruptions.

What Happens Next

Oil prices have already spiked above $100 a barrel. Analysts expect elevated prices for oil, natural gas, and food for at least another year. Fertilizer — much of it produced in the Gulf — is one of the invisible costs of the Hormuz crisis. Jet fuel, plastics, and microprocessor manufacturing inputs are others. The IEA flagged these supply-chain dependencies in a report that went largely unreported outside energy circles.

Renewables are being discussed as a hedge. Solar and wind investments are rising. But Goldwyn noted that transportation is hard to decarbonize quickly. There is no great substitute for diesel in heavy equipment or aviation. Renewables will not relieve fossil fuel price risk for five to eight years at the earliest, if ever.

And the data problem remains unresolved. The Trump administration claims “total control” of Hormuz through a naval blockade. But tanker tracking is hobbled. Ships turn off their AIS transponders to avoid detection. Satellite providers have restricted imagery of the area at the U.S. government’s request. McNally described trackers as effectively blind. Without visibility, markets trade on guesswork. Guesswork inflates volatility.

The Real Story

The U.S. is telling a story it needs to hear — that infrastructure can replace geography, that pipelines can neutralize a strait, that the threat can be engineered away. The experts are telling a harder story — that the strait will matter for years, that alternatives are partial and vulnerable, and that the conflict dynamics (Iran wanting payment for exports, the U.S. unable to force freedom of navigation) are not going to change.

Consumers are the bridge between the two. They will feel the outcome regardless of which narrative proves correct. The question is whether Washington knows it is betting on a timeline that may not exist — and whether the world is prepared for what happens when the pipelines aren’t enough.