Iran's Strait of Hormuz Leverage Is Crumbling — What Comes Next

The card Iran held for decades is losing its value — and that changes everything

On Thursday evening, Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, called the clearance of Iranian sea mines from the Strait of Hormuz a “major milestone.” Nearly 1,500 vessels carrying roughly 750 million barrels of crude oil have transited the strait under US protection since the operations began in late February. The message from Washington was unambiguous: Iran’s ability to weaponize the world’s most critical oil chokepoint is being dismantled, ship by ship, mine by mine.

Six months ago, that threat was Tehran’s insurance policy. Today, it is looking increasingly like a liability that no longer pays out.

Hormuz was never as decisive as Iran claimed

Thomas O’Donnell, a strategist at the Wilson Center, told The Jerusalem Post that even before the war, 14 to 15 million barrels per day flowed through Hormuz — and that the global market could manage without much of that supply. Spare capacity in the Gulf, alternative routes through Oman, and sustained demand destruction made the figure more rhetorical than existential.

That was true in peace. It should have been clearer in war.

Iran’s calculus was always that choking Hormuz would force the world to pressure Washington into negotiation. But the US has not folded. Instead, it has stationed 50,000 troops in the region and conducted a sustained mine-clearing campaign. The blockade is now a protected corridor. The insurance policy has expired, and Iran has not replaced it.

The vacuum in Syria is already being filled

While the world watches the Gulf, a quieter realignment is unfolding in Syria. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government — Islamist-led since the fall of the Assad regime — has appointed Mazloum Abdi, the former commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, as a senior adviser. Abdi dissolved the SDF as an independent military force this week, completing a step in an integration plan agreed earlier this year.

This matters for Israel. The SDF was, for years, a de facto stabilizing force on Israel’s northern flank — a check on both Tehran’s influence and Kurdish independence movements that could spill across borders. Its dissolution and absorption into a Damascus-led framework shifts the calculus in ways that are not yet visible but will be.

Israel struck the Beit Jinn area near the Syrian border on Thursday evening, according to Maariv. Whether this is a reaction to the shifting Syrian landscape or a continuation of the broader campaign against Iranian entrenchment remains unclear. What is clear is that Israel is no longer operating in a static theater. Every move in Damascus reverberates north.

Barnea’s warning: sanctions alone will not suffice

David Barnea, Israel’s former Mossad chief, gave his first public speech since stepping down in June. His message was blunt: Iran’s regime will fall, but not through sanctions alone. “There will be no choice, in my view, other than to escalate the economic actions, the policies, and the operations against the regime until it falls, and it will fall,” he said.

Barnea, who received an award from the Jerusalem Municipality, framed the Trump administration’s recent economic measures as correct but insufficient. He did not specify whether that insufficiency would be addressed through renewed airstrikes, covert sabotage, or a combination — but his language pointed toward escalation, not containment.

The timing is notable. Barnea’s speech came the same day as CENTCOM’s announcement about Hormuz. Two different capitals, one converging assessment: Iran’s remaining cards are fewer than they were six months ago, and the West is preparing to play them anyway.

Gaza is hardening, not opening

Meanwhile, Israel is drawing a line in the sand on Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yisrael Katz issued a joint statement on Thursday denying any instruction to reopen the Erez Border Crossing. Preparations were underway for a September 1 opening, COGAT sources confirmed, but final approval has not been given.

“There will be no reconstruction before the disarmament of the Hamas terrorist organization and the complete demilitarization of the Gaza Strip,” they said.

That stance is absolute. It is also politically volatile. Reports emerged the same week that Netanyahu held direct talks with Hamas officials behind the security establishment’s back during the 2014 Gaza war — a revelation that cuts both ways. It suggests pragmatism when the opportunity arose, but it also exposes the gap between public posture and private maneuvering that defines Israeli decision-making on Gaza.

The Erez reopening is not just a humanitarian question. It is a signal. If Israel opens the crossing without preconditions, it signals that the war’s objectives are being reframed. If it holds the line, it signals that the postwar order is still being written — and that Israel intends to write it alone.

Trump’s language and Iran’s denials

On Thursday, Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran is “begging” for a deal. “I don’t want to meet, they do,” he wrote. The tone was confrontational but revealing: Washington perceives Iranian desperation even as Iran’s military posture has not fundamentally changed.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council head, Mohsen Rezaee, dismissed reports of a plot to assassinate Barron Trump as a lie, speaking on Lebanon’s Al Manar TV. The US Secret Service had flagged the reports days earlier. Whether the allegation is credible or propaganda, it underscores the personal stakes now embedded in the conflict — something that elevates the risk of miscalculation on both sides.

Iran’s Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad confirmed that oil sales and deliveries to “distant waters” continue despite reductions. The regime is still generating revenue. It is still surviving. But survival without leverage is not the same as strength.

Who wins, who loses, what comes next

The immediate winner is the US, which has reestablished freedom of navigation through the strait without triggering a broader naval war. The secondary winner is Israel, which benefits from a regional environment where Iran’s proxies are degraded and its direct military options are shrinking.

The loser is the Iranian regime, whose primary deterrent has been neutralized and whose alternative strategies — rockets, drones, asymmetric operations — carry diminishing returns. The regime may yet survive. But survival without strategic depth is a fragile thing.

What comes next depends on whether Washington and Jerusalem treat Iran’s weakening as an opportunity for a negotiated settlement or as an invitation to press further. Barnea’s speech suggested the latter. Trump’s rhetoric is consistent with it. The question is whether the Israeli security establishment and the Pentagon share that instinct — or whether they see a ceiling before regime change becomes the explicit goal.

The Strait of Hormuz is clear for now. But clear waters do not mean calm seas.